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Abstract  
 
The dynamics of natural resources revenue – the payment due to the sovereign 
owner (government) in exchange for the right to extract the mineral substance – is 
complex, how it is fixed and paid. It is controversial and significant, as it is a revenue 
that is unique to the resources sector and also that has been fixed and paid in multiple 
extractive tax regimes, sometimes on the measures of profitability, but more often based 
on ad valorem (value based) or the unit of the mineral extracted. We try to analyse how 
dynamic revenue from natural resources across the States in India , within a 
comparative framework with other (direct and indirect) taxes. Using the ARDL 
methodology, we have tried to estimate the revenue buoyancy within States and 
between the States in a panel, and analysed the short run and long run coefficients and 
their speed of adjustment. Using HP filter, we tried to estimate the potential GDP, and 
also analysed the  cyclicality of revenue buoyancy using output gap variable across 
states. Our findings revealed that revenue from natural resources is a buoyant source of 
revenue, though there is distinct State-specific differentials. The policy implication of 
our study for the natural resources sector is the rate rationalisation as higher rates 
revised upward every three years through Royalty Study Group by Government of India 
can affect the revenue augmentation if Laffer Curve starts operating and in turn it 
affects the firm level competitiveness. The decision of shifting the mining regime from 
tonnage regime to ad-valorem regime for non-atomic non-ferrous is welcome, as it is 
market-linked.  
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Introduction  
The dynamics of natural resources revenue – the payment due to the sovereign 
owner (government) in exchange for the right to extract the mineral substance – is 
complex, how it is fixed and paid. This is a  controversial realm, as the revenue from 
natural resources is unique and also that has been fixed and paid in multiple extractive 
industrial regimes, sometimes on the measures of profitability, but more often based on 
ad valorem (value based) or the unit of the mineral extracted.  
In the context of reforms/amendments related to the ways in which natural 
resources sector is regulated and taxed, there is a growing recognition to examine the 
responsiveness of the natural resource taxation to the GDP in comparison with other 
taxes. This paper is confined to the analysis of buoyancy of the mining taxation vis a 
vis other direct and indirect taxes in the context of India across its 28 States. The 
buoyancy is defined as the responsiveness of revenue to a change in the GDP. We 
confine our analysis to mining, as we do not have any other significant source of 
revenue from natural resources augmenting the States’ revenue and in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers mechanism in India, unlike other federations, the 
revenue from natural resources has not yet been designed or integrated within the 
divisible pool of tax sharing with the other sources of revenue including direct taxes 
and GST.  
The paper is organised into  sections. Section 1 looks into the natural resources 
sector specific dynamics, with special emphasis on mining sector. Section 2 analyses 
the existing literature on tax buoyancy. Section 3 presents the data sources and 
methodology. Section 4 presents the buoyancy estimates of mining taxation in 
comparison with other direct and indirect taxes across major states in India. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
I. Dynamics of Natural Resources sector and Mining Regime in 
India 
 
Globally, the global mining arrangements are broadly categorized into three: 
unit based, ad-valorem based or profit based. The unit based royalty is the royalty is 
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determined with reference to the volume of production, or is determined with reference 
to gross revenues. It is also referred to as tonnage-based royalty or unit-based royalty. 
The ad valorem royalty is calculated by applying a percentage rate to the gross sale 
value. It is also referred to as value-based royalty. This is usually ‘ex-mine’ or pithead 
value (sale realisation) less allowable expenditure. The Profit-based royalty, where the 
royalty is calculated as a percentage of gross/net profit. 
 
Mining royalty regime varies widely between countries and minerals. Minerals 
include coal, metallic minerals and non-metallic minerals. As mentioned earlier, there 
are three types of royalty tax systems in the world namely: Unit Based, Ad valorem 
(value based) and Profit based. India follows both tonnage and as valorem based royalty 
rates.  India is having the highest royalty rates in the world. Apart from royalty, almost 
all countries rely on profit (income) based taxes and Value Added Tax (VAT) for 
revenue argumentation.  While designing the income tax system, though a policy maker 
can grapple with two key elements, the tax rate, and the tax base that the rate is applied 
to, empirical evidence suggests that in most nations, income tax policy is mainly 
implemented through manipulation of the tax base rather than through the tax rate.  
Broadly the tax rate is either uniform for all tax-payers, or for all tax payers at a given 
level of profit.  While some countries impose a flat rate on all commercial taxpayers, a 
few have a progressive tax scheme that imposes higher tax rates on taxpayers with 
higher levels of profit.  
 
Even the royalty rates in India are at the highest level. The rate of royalties on 
iron ore is 15% and that on coal is 14% which is way more than the other countries of 
the world. The rate of royalties on iron ore and coal in South Africa is in the range of 
0.5% to 7% and has dependent on whether the mineral is refined or unrefined. In 
Philippines, the rate of royalties is at least 55 per cent of the market value of gross 
output of the minerals extracted. The rate has also been decided by the company and 
the indigenous cultural community but the rate should not be less than 1%.  
Mining taxation regime in India is in a state of flux. Particularly, the current 
methodology of royalty estimation for mining sector requires a relook. The mining 
royalty regime in India is onerous. India has one of highest royalty rates in the world. 
Though there has been an increasing trend in the regime shift in mining royalty away 
from the tonnage royalty regime to ad valorem, the rationalization of rates to 
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internationally competitive rates has not yet materialized. Every three years, the royalty 
rates are revised upwards in India. 
 
In ferrous royalty regime, though there has been a shift from tonnage to ad 
valorem, the base estimation suffers from discretion in deciding the grade content 
(ʎ1,2,3…n) in the following formula) of the extracted ore in arriving at royalty 
calculations. 
RROM = [ʎ 1,2,3…n ROM] * ϒore 
where 
RROM =  Royalty revenue from metal contained in Fe ore 
ʎ 1,2,3…n            =  Grade percent of Metal in the different types of extracted 
iron ore  
ROM  =  Tonnage of Run of Mine (ROM) Ore Treated 
ϒore  =  Prevailing Royalty Rate on the Fe ore 
 
There is a regime shift in ferrous royalty since 2012. Prior to 2012, the Fe 
royalty was estimated on the basis of tonnage method.  
 
RROM = [ʎ * ROM] * [α PIBM] * ϒore 
RROM =  Royalty revenue from metal contained in the ore 
ʎ  =  Grade percent of Metal in the extracted ore  
ROM  =  Tonnage of Run of Mine (ROM) Ore Treated 
PIBM  =  IBM Fe Prices 
ϒore  =  Prevailing Royalty Rate on the Fe ore 
 
The grade percent was different for ore lumps and fines, and also within each 
category. The recent royalty rate for iron is as high as 15 per cent ad valorem of national 
benchmark (IBM) price. 
  
II. Tax Buoyancy : Conceptual and Empirical Issues 
 
Effective fiscal consolidation path is through better tax buoyancy than 
expenditure compression. There is an increasing recognition of the role of government 
spending in enhancing economic growth, however whether rising economic growth 
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would raise enough sufficient tax revenue to maintain fiscal deficit GDP threshold to 3 
per cent across States needs to be examined. The answer to whether increase in 
economic growth will raise tax revenue so as to maintain fiscal deficit to GDP threshold 
ratio fiscal balances depends on an important ingredient of a tax system, the “tax 
buoyancy”, the measure of how tax revenues responds to changes in GDP (Dudine 
Paolo and Joao Tovar Jalle, 2017, Blanchard, Dell’Aricia and Mauro, 2010).  
 
A tax buoyancy of one would imply that an increase in GDP by one percent of 
GDP would increase tax revenue also by one percent, thus leaving the tax-to-GDP ratio 
unchanged. From the perspective of meeting the FRBM targets, a tax buoyancy 
exceeding one is required. When the tax buoyancy exceeds one, tax revenue increases 
more than GDP. If tax buoyancy is below unity, tax revenues are not increasing as much 
the increase in GDP. 
 
Why tax buoyancy is crucial in fiscal policy practices? First, tax buoyancy 
reflects the role of revenue policy in fiscal consolidation efforts in India. The 
responsiveness of tax to economic growth is crucial for fiscal sustainability in the long 
run. Tax buoyancy reflects both the structural policies and automatic stabilisers. The 
responsiveness of tax to fluctuations in output (output) at the state level is crucial for 
long term fiscal frameworks of subnational governments. Second, tax buoyancy gives 
indication to the government, whether effective tax mobilization efforts can increase 
the revenue in concomitant with economic growth. The tax buoyancy estimates help 
the fiscal authorities to be certain about the sustained increase in tax revenue in line 
with GDP growth. Three, it helps in designing the structural policies relate to tax 
regime, and also in forecasting macro-fiscal variables towards fiscal consolidation. 
 
In this paper we ask four questions. How the natural resource tax buoyancy 
varies across Indian States vis a vis other taxes, both over short run and long run and 
the speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium? How tax buoyancy varies across 
the panel of high income, low income and middle income States in India? Do natural 
resource tax buoyancies remain the same during the different periods in India? How tax 
buoyancy responds to the cyclicality in output gaps of subnational governments in 
India? 
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
We analyse the tax buoyancy for the period 2000-01 to present and specifically 
for the period 2011-12 to 2018-19. The data for macro-fiscal variables are organized 
from State Finance Accounts and Budget documents. The state wise GSDP variables 
collated from CSO. The data for GSDP is made comparable over the period of analysis 
using splicing method.   
  
The tax buoyancy is calculated using the following formula: 
Log (T) = a + b1 log (GSDP) + u 
Where b1 is the tax buoyancy  
T = tax revenue 
GSDP = Gross State Domestic Product 
 
We have used time series techniques to deal with the constraints of the short 
time series. The short run buoyancy and long run buoyancy estimates are reported with 
the speed of adjustment.  
 
We used ARDL to estimate the dynamic time series.   
Equation 1 
 
∆ ln 𝑦%& = 𝜑%𝑦%&)* + 𝛽%
-𝑥%&)* + 𝜆%0
1)*
02*
∆ ln 𝑦%&)0 + 𝛾%0
-
4)*
42*
∆ ln 𝑥%&)0 + 𝜇% + 𝜉%& , 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
 
 
where yit is the natural logarithm of tax revenue variable, xit is the natural logarithm of 
GDP . We have not used a set of potential controls in the regression in the initial round. 
The coefficient on the 𝜑%𝑦%&)*lagged dependent are the other explanatory variables, 
𝜑%𝑦%&)*are scalar coefficients on lagged first-differences of dependent variables.  
 
𝜆%0
1)*
02* ∆ ln 𝑦%&)0coefficient vectors on first-differences of explanatory variables and 
their lagged values. 𝜉%& , 𝑖𝑠	independently distributed across i and t, with zero means and 
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constant variances. Equation (1) translates that change in tax revenue can be determined 
by a distributed lag of order p of the dependent variable (tax), and a distributed lag of 
order q of GDP.  
 
Assuming that 𝜃%
- <	0 for all i, there exists a long-run relationship between yit 
and xit :   
 
Equation 2 
 
ln 𝑦%& = 𝜃%
- ln 𝑥%& + 𝜂%& , 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
 
 
Equation (1) can then be rewritten as:  
 
Equation 3 
 
∆ ln 𝑦%& = 𝜑%𝜂%&)* + 𝜆%0
1)*
02*
∆ ln 𝑦%&)0 + 𝛾%0
-
4)*
42*
∆ ln 𝑥%&)0 + 𝜇% + 𝜉%& , 
𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
 
 
where	𝜂%&)* is the error correction term (that is, the deviation of variables at a 
certain point in time from their long run equilibrium), and 𝜑%i is measures the speed of 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. This specification allows capturing the 
idea that an equilibrium relationship links revenue and GDP in the long-run, but that 
the dependent variable may deviate from its equilibrium path in the short-run (due, e.g., 
to shocks that may be persistent) (Dudine , Paolo and Joao Tovar Jalles , 2017).  
 
IV Tax Buoyancy Estimates: Time Series Estimates of Individual 
States 
 
The tax buoyancy estimates for the period 2011-12 to 2018-19 showed that all 
States except Jammu Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka 
has tax buoyancy exceeding unity.  
	 8	
 
Figure 1: Tax Buoyancy across States of India, 2011-12 to 2018-19 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget documents (various years) and CSO 
(various years) 
 
The revenue (tax plus nontax revenue) buoyancy is also calculated across states 
for comparison purposes (Figure 2).  The total revenue buoyancy across States show 
that except Sikkim (0.2), Andhra Pradesh (0.74), Mizoram (0.74), Jammu Kashmir 
(0.82), Manipur (0.83), Tripura (0.84), Tamil Nadu (0.90), Gujarat (0.93) and Goa 
(0.99), all other states have revenue buoyancy exceeding unity.  
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Figure 2: Total Revenue Buoyancy across States of India, 2011-12 to 
2018-19 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget documents (various years) and 
CSO (various years) 
 
The non-tax revenue buoyancy of the States revealed that except Goa, Andhra 
Pradesh and a few North Eastern States, all other States have non-tax buoyancy greater 
than one. Punjab (1.94) and Kerala (1.89) top the scale. The mining States like 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Rajasthan are also among the top States with 
regard to non-tax revenue buoyancy. 
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Figure 3: Non-Tax Revenue Buoyancy across States of India, 2011-12 to 2018-19 
 
Source: Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget documents (various years) and 
CSO (various years) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV.1. Tax Buoyancy: ARDL Estimates  
 
Often, fiscal stimulus is launched through the tax side than expenditure side 
assuming that the buoyancy of the former will ensure minimum fiscal slippage, while 
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shoving the economy out of a glut. The general idea is that a reduction in rates will 
increase the tax base and compliance. This along with its positive impact on growth 
would lead to higher tax buoyancy. The fiscal stimulus programme announced by 
finance minister is also premised on similar idea. An IMF working paper titled ‘How 
buoyant is the tax system? New evidence from a large heterogeneous panel’ by Paulo 
Dudine and Joao Tovar Jalles, published in 2017 finds that tax buoyancies are generally 
equal to unity or greater for developed as well as for less developed economies.  
 
In our economy, the tax-GDP ratio has hovered around 14-17% for the last few 
decades, which is the combined figure for the Union and the States. Direct and indirect 
taxes contribute almost equally to the total tax revenue although the share of direct taxes 
is slightly higher at 52% during 2017-18. Union collects about 10% of GDP as tax 
revenue and the rest is by all the States together. The finance minister’s stimulus 
package is premised on the buoyancy of these taxes. Hence, it is imperative to look at 
the tax buoyancy factor both at the Union and States level during the recent past.  
 
Tax buoyancy measures the response of tax revenue to a change in national 
income and the tax policy. Economists generally define it as the ratio of percentage 
change in tax revenue to a percentage change in income. Buoyancy can be estimated 
for the long term as well as for the short term. Short-term buoyancy above unity 
signifies that the tax system acts as an automatic stabiliser. Here, the tax system itself 
would automatically leave a greater proportion of income with the taxpayers during a 
slowdown dampening the fall in demand. Similarly, during a boom, the system would 
automatically take away more income through taxes consequently slowing down the 
growth of demand.  Such a tax system has a built-in-stabiliser in it. In other words, the 
short run buoyancy measures the instantaneous effect of a change in GDP on the tax 
revenue.  
 
Long-run buoyancy is important in gauging the impact of long-run growth of 
the economy on fiscal sustainability. Long run buoyancy above unity would mean that 
faster growth would lead to better fiscal balance through the revenue side. This would 
be an important guiding principle while considering counter cyclical fiscal measures, 
meaning, an increased fiscal deficit would trigger growth, which can in turn generate 
more tax revenue, leading to the easing of fiscal pressure.  
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Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model allows us to estimate the long-
run and short-run buoyancy along with the speed of adjustment. Speed of adjustment 
tells us how fast the buoyancy converges to the long run equilibrium value.  The 
estimates for the period, 2001-2017, show that the long-run and short-run buoyancy are 
1.05 and 1.74, respectively, for total tax (Union and states combined). The high short-
run buoyancy will mean that the current slow down would have an amplified negative 
impact on tax revenue in the short-run. The slow down will have a heavy impact on the 
Union tax revenue which has an overall short-run buoyancy coefficient which is very 
high. The very high short-run buoyancy of direct taxes will escalate the fiscal pressure 
emanating from the recent cut in corporation taxes. This will also have a deleterious 
effect on the fiscal health of the States as the shareable kitty will shrink substantially. 
Now with the 15
th
 Finance Commission (FC) asked to consider the impact of the award 
of 14
th
 FC on Union Finances, any fall in the share of the States would adversely affect 
the State finances. 
 
Relatively low buoyancy for States’ taxes (1.04 for the long run and 1.19 for 
short run) will mean a reduced adverse impact of the slowdown on States as a whole. 
But the effect on individual States will depend on their buoyancies and the extent of 
deceleration of gross state domestic product of respective States. Short run buoyancy is 
found to be either equal to or less than unity for all the States. Bihar, Goa, Haryana, 
Jharkhand, Odisha and Sikkim will be the States that would be least affected in the short 
run, with a buoyancy factor less than unity. For the long term, all States have 
buoyancies either equal to unity or greater than unity. Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, 
West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland and Sikkim have long-run buoyancy equal to one 
making them less vulnerable in the long run. Interestingly, most of the richer States fall 
in this category.  
 
 
Figure 4: Buoyancy of Tax and Natural Resources Revenue 
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Source: Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget documents (various years) and 
CSO (various years) 
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parameterisation in the models by choosing the apt lag lengths, the estimates can be 
refined further by incorporating variables like inflation, structural variables, political 
factors and business cycles in the tax buoyancy estimation models. At disaggregate 
level analysis, it is also important to see whether the buoyancy of divisible pool taxes 
is greater than States’ own taxes. Along with these, an understanding of how tax 
buoyancies behave in different phases of business cycle (output gap) will throw more 
light on the effectiveness of such polices. 
 
Table 1: Buoyancy of Own Tax Revenue of States 
 State Long-Run Buoyancy Short-Run Buoyancy Speed of 
Adjustment 
 
 
 
Low 
Income 
 <1 1 >1 <1 1 >1  
Bihar  
1.12*** 
(0.12) 
 
0.42** 
(0.22) 
  
-0.21* 
(0.11) 
Chhattisgarh   
1.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.81*** 
(0.18) 
  
-0.97*** 
(0.05) 
Jharkhand   
1.17*** 
(0.04) 
0.47** 
(0.21) 
  
-0.91*** 
(0.1) 
Madhya Pradesh  
1.05*** 
(0.04) 
  
0.75* 
(0.39) 
 
-0.55** 
(0.24) 
Odisha   
1.14*** 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
  
-0.23** 
(0.09) 
Rajasthan  
0.97*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.25* 
(0.14) 
  
-0.16 
(0.1) 
Uttar Pradesh   
1.16*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.65** 
(0.28) 
 
-0.41*** 
(0.13) 
 
 
Middle 
Income 
Andhra Pradesh  
1.52*** 
(0.37) 
 
0.05 
(0.15) 
  
-0.07 
(0.07) 
Karnataka 
0.94*** 
(0.03) 
  
0.47*** 
(0.12) 
  
-0.26* 
(0.15) 
Kerala 
0.89*** 
(0.04) 
  
0.39** 
(0.14) 
  
-0.27* 
(0.13) 
Punjab  
1.02*** 
(0.05) 
  
0.63 
(0.39) 
 
-0.41** 
(0.17) 
West Bengal  
1.09*** 
(0.16) 
 
0.41 
(0.29) 
  
-0.12 
(0.08) 
 
 
High 
Income 
Goa 
0.87*** 
(0.1) 
  
0.1 
(0.15) 
  
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
Gujarat 
0.91*** 
(0.05) 
  
0.62*** 
(0.21) 
  
-0.22* 
(0.12) 
Haryana  0.93***  
-0.09 
(0.29) 
  
-0.18 
(0.11) 
Maharashtra 
0.95*** 
(0.02) 
  
0.56*** 
(0.14) 
  
-0.47*** 
(0.15) 
Tamil Nadu 
0.92*** 
(0.03) 
  
0.53*** 
(0.16) 
  
-0.39** 
(0.15) 
 
 
Arunachal 
Pradesh  
  
1.56*** 
(0.07) 
 
0.41 
(0.42) 
 
-0.37** 
(0.17) 
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Special 
Category 
Assam   
1.17*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.65** 
(0.25) 
 
-0.19 
(0.11) 
Himachal 
Pradesh  
 
1.04*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.44* 
(0.22) 
  
-0.27*** 
(0.12) 
Jammu & 
Kashmir  
  
1.29*** 
(0.03) 
 
0.64** 
(0.26) 
 
-0.63*** 
(0.19) 
Manipur   
1.33*** 
(0.1) 
 
0.56* 
(0.3) 
 
-0.25* 
(0.12) 
Mizoram   
1.73*** 
(0.29) 
-0.31 
(0.25) 
  
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
Meghalaya  
1.13*** 
(0.09) 
 
0.3 
(0.19) 
  
-0.17*** 
(0.07) 
Nagaland   
1.32*** 
(0.13) 
 
0.58** 
(0.26) 
 
-0.22** 
(0.08) 
Sikkim  
0.99*** 
(0.08) 
 
0.19 
(0.19) 
  
-0.23* 
(0.13) 
Tripura   
1.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
  
-0.16** 
(0.16) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1; GDP and GSDP data are from RBI database   
Source: (Basic data), NIPFP database of Finance Accounts (various years). 
 
 
Table 2: Categorisation of States as per Buoyancy 
 
Buoyancy of Own 
tax Revenue 
        States 
 
Short-run 
Buoyancy 
<1 Bihar, Goa, Haryana, Jharkand, Odisha, Sikkim 
 
=1 
Andhra Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West 
Bengal, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Mizoram, Thripura 
 
Long-run 
Buoyancy 
>1 Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkand, 
Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Thripura.  
 
=1 
Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Assam, Nagaland and Sikkim 
Source: (Basic data), NIPFP database of Finance Accounts.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Revenue Buoyancy of Natural Resources, By States 
 State Long-Run Buoyancy Short-Run Buoyancy Speed of 
Adjustment 
 
 
 
Low 
Income 
 <1 1 >1 <1 1 >1  
Bihar 0.68*** 
(0.07) 
   1.44** 
(0.84) 
 -0.21* 
(0.11) 
Chhattisgarh  
1.04*** 
(0.09) 
 
0.13     
(0.53) 
  
-0.67***    
(0.14)       
 
Jharkhand  
1.00*** 
(0.06) 
 
-0.06     
(0.32) 
  
-0.78***     
(0.13)          
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Madhya 
Pradesh 
0.78*** 
(0.01) 
  
-0.07 
(0.35) 
  
-0.35***       
 (0.10)           
 
Odisha 
0.79*** 
(0.02) 
   
0.96*** 
(0.28) 
 
-0.14***     
 (0.04)           
 
Rajasthan 
0.83*** 
(0.07) 
  
0.34         
(0.26) 
  
-0.05*     
(0.02) 
Uttar Pradesh 
0.69*** 
(0.04) 
   
1.97** 
(0.81) 
 
 
-0.14       
-(0.04)       
 
 
 
Middle 
Income 
Andhra Pradesh 
0.78*** 
(0.03) 
  
-0.56  
(0.53) 
 
  
-0.21**       
    -(0.07)         
 
Karnataka 0.78*** 
(0.06) 
 
  
0.05 
(0.35) 
 
  
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
 
Kerala 
0.67*** 
(0.05) 
 
   
-0.94 
(0.85) 
 
-0.15** 
0.06 
 
Punjab 
0.6*** 
(0.12) 
  
0.22 
(1.08) 
  
-0.09 
(0.07) 
 
West Bengal  -   -  
-0.12 
(0.08) 
High 
Income Goa 
0.56*** 
(0.15) 
 
     
-0.22*** 
(0.07) 
Gujarat 
0.75*** 
(0.01) 
 
   
1.29*** 
(0.39) 
 
-0.56***      
 (0.18)        
 
Haryana 
0.69*** 
(0.07) 
  
-0.54 
(0.93) 
 
  
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
 
Maharashtra 
0.69*** 
(0.03) 
 
  
1.25*** 
(0.28) 
 
  
-0.16** 
(0.06) 
 
Tamil Nadu 
0.7*** 
(0.02) 
 
  
-0.22 
(0.64) 
 
  
-0.44*** 
(0.14) 
 
 
 
 
 
Special 
Category 
Arunachal 
Pradesh  
0.63*** 
(0.07) 
   
1.75** 
(0.62) 
 
-0.15* 
(0.08) 
 
Assam 
0.85*** 
(0.13) 
    
2.36 
(1.77) 
-0.77 
(0.22) 
 
Himachal 
Pradesh  
0.72*** 
(0.03) 
   
1.36 
(0.94) 
 
-0.29** 
(0.10) 
 
Jammu & 
Kashmir  
0.81** 
(0.39) 
      
Manipur 
0.32*** 
(0.06) 
   
0.56* 
(0.3) 
 
 
-0.68*** 
(0.19) 
 
Mizoram 
0.67 
(0.42) 
     
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
Meghalaya 
0.72*** 
(0.05) 
   
1.48 
(1.2) 
 
-0.43*** 
(0.16) 
Nagaland 
0.42*** 
(0.06) 
   
1.78 
(2.18) 
 
-0.57*** 
(0.17) 
Sikkim 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
   
1.11 
(1.27) 
 
-0.70*** 
(0.18) 
Tripura - -  - - -  
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Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1 
GSDP data are from RBI database 
Source: Mining revenue data is from NIPFP database of Finance Accounts.  
 
IV. 2 Tax Buoyancy: Panel Group Estimates across Category of States 
 
We have estimated dynamic panel coefficients for three categories of States –
high income, middle income and low income States for the macro-fiscal variables under 
concern. (table 1) 
 
Table 4:  Dynamic Panel Buoyancy Estimates using Output Gap 
Variables Low Income 
States 
High Income 
States 
Middle Income 
States 
All States 
Tax 1.105 
(0.0314) 
[0.0000] 
0.908 
(0.049) 
[0.0000] 
1.036 
(0.0336) 
[0.0000] 
0.932 
(0.03) 
[0.000] 
Note: The figures in bracket refers to Standard Error. The figures in square parentheses 
refer to Probability.  
Source: (basic data) , Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget 
documents (various years) and CSO (various years) 
 
The dynamic panel estimates show that the overall buoyancy of all states over 
the period 2011-12 to 2018-19 is less than unity at 0.98. With the categories of the states 
based on income, the tax buoyancy of low income states was 1.105 while the tax 
buoyancy of middle income states was 1.04. The tax buoyancy of high income states 
was relatively lower at 0.908 during this period.  The output gap is estimated using the 
following formula.  
 
OG=[(Actual GDP-Potential GDP)/Potential GDP] *100    
    
This is also known as the “economic activity index” (Congdon 1998; Tanzi 
1985; Chakraborty, 2016). It can be seen from equation that the “output gap,” or the 
index of economic activity, is defined as the difference between the actual and 
trend/potential level of national output as a percentage of trend/potential output. 
Definitionally speaking, the potential level of output would be higher than the actual, 
as the resource utilization is maximized at the potential level. However, it is argued that 
cyclical factors, such as a recession or boom, could cause the actual to be below or 
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above the potential output, respectively (Tanzi 1985). The major problem of estimation 
of the “output gap” lies on the estimation of potential level of output.
2
 
 
The Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) is the method used for the derivation of 
the potential output. The idea of this filter is to decompose a nonstationary time series, 
such as actual output, into a stationary cyclical component and a smooth trend 
component (Yt and 𝑌&
∗  denote the logarithms of actual and trend/potential output 
respectively) by minimizing the variance of the cyclical component subject to a penalty 
for the variation in the second difference of the trend component. This results in the 
following constrained least-square problem:  
    
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑌& − 𝑌&
∗ ²
K
&2*
+ 	𝜆 𝑌&L*
∗ − 𝑌&
∗ − 𝑌&
∗ − 𝑌&)*
∗ ²
K)*
&2M
 
 
The first term in the equation is a measure of fit. The second term is a measure 
of smoothness. The Langrange multiplier (λ) is associated with the smoothness 
constraint and must be set a priori. As a weighting factor, it determines how smooth the 
resulting output series is. The lower the λ, the closer potential output follows actual 
output.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Dynamic Panel Estimates_ Buoyancy of Natural Resource Revenue and Own 
Tax revenue – All States Analysis  
																																																						
2
  Theoretically, the “production function method” estimates the trend/potential output by determining 
the quantity and productivity of inputs, viz., labor and capital. The relative importance of the two inputs 
are determined by assuming that their return is determined by their marginal products and their share in 
the national output is equal to their quantity multiplied by the return (Adams and Coe 1990; Congdon 
1998). Trend output estimation through the “production function method” requires data on labor force 
and capital stock. If data on one or both of these series are not available, one has to search for other 
methods of estimation of trend output. One of the most commonly used methods of estimation of trend 
output is the “moving average method.” Another method, known as “trend through peaks” (hereafter, 
TTP), was developed by Klein with Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. The steps involved 
in estimation are delineated below. The first step is to plot the data on GDP adjusted for price fluctuations 
and identify the peaks. Second, it is assumed that identified peaks in the series are the points where 
resources in the economy are used at 100 percent of their capacity. The third step is to intrapolate between 
the major peaks, including the first and last observation. The strong assumptions beneath the TTP method 
itself deterred us from using it as a tool for estimating potential output. 
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VARIABLES Mineral Royalty Own Tax Revenue 
   
Lagged Mineral Royalty 0.427*** 
(0.0273) 
 
 
Gross State Domestic Product 0.655*** 
(0.0276) 
0.541*** 
(0.0151) 
 
Lagged Own Tax Revenue  0.481*** 
(0.0183) 
 
Constant -5.745*** 
(0.436) 
-1.754*** 
(0.145) 
   
Observations 700 700 
Number of states 28 28 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: (basic data) , Finance Accounts of States (various years), State Budget 
documents (various years) and CSO (various years) 
 
 
 
We observe highly significant effects for lagged values of Mineral Royalty and Own 
Tax Revenue on their current values, showing that a persistent series. The revenue 
buoyancy of natural resources is to the tune of 0.65, whereas own tax revenue for the 
period in consideration stands at 0.54. The buoyancy of mining revenue is slightly 
higher than the own tax revenue.   
 
V Conclusion 
 
Using the ADRL methodology, we have tried to estimate the revenue buoyancy 
within States and between States in a panel , and analysed the short run and long run 
coefficients and their speed of adjustment. Using HP filter, we tried to estimate the 
potential GDP, and also analysed the  cyclicality of tax buoyancy using output gap 
variable across states. Our findings revealed that natural resource taxation is a buoyant 
source of revenue comparable to the buoyancy coefficients of other taxes across States, 
though the coefficients are always not above unity across States. The policy implication 
of our study for the natural sector is the rate rationalisation as higher rates revised every 
three years can affect the revenue augmentation. 
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